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Do	the	UK’s	backstop	proposals	signal	progress?
The	publication	of	the	UK	government’s	technical	note	on	customs	arrangements	the	other	week
was	welcome.	After	months	of	requests	from	the	EU	and	the	Irish	government,	the	UK	government
have,	at	last,	provided	a	written	draft	plan	on	the	Irish	border	to	discuss.	In	this	blog,	Etain	Tannam
(Trinity	College	Dublin)	explains	whether	the	UK’s	backstop	proposals	signal	progress?
British-Irish	relations	had	become	increasingly	strained	over	the	previous	18	months.	The	Irish
government	and	the	EU	had	repeatedly	stated	that	there	could	be	no	transition	agreement	unless
the	backstop	was	written	into	legal	text.	The	note	attempted	to	meet,	or	at	least	acknowledge,	this	demand.
The	main	elements	of	the	technical	note	have	already	been	detailed	on	this	website.	In	particular,	the	technical	note
proposed	that	the	backstop	arrangement	be	extended	to	all	of	the	UK,	not	just	Northern	Ireland.
The	UK	government’s	expectation	was	that	it	could	end	in	2021,	when	the	future	customs	relationship	may	be
agreed.	The	note	also	proposes	that	the	UK	will	be	able	to	benefit	from	the	EU’s	free	trade	agreements	(FTAs)	and
states	its	wish	to	avoid	any	EU	controls.
There	is	scope	in	the	note	for	both	positive	and	negative	predictions.	The	note	provides	bargaining	space	in	the
Brexit	negotiations.	But	it	raises	the	continuous	issue	of	the	UK	‘cherry-picking’	its	relationship	with	the	EU	–	gaining
the	benefits	of	the	single	market,	without	the	obligations.
From	a	UK	domestic	bargaining	perspective,	the	note	avoids	alienating	the	DUP	and	Brexiteers	in	the	short	term
because	it	provides	an	alternative	to	a	sea	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	Britain.	It	also	asserts	that	the	UK
will	leave	the	customs	union	when	it	leaves	the	EU.
However,	although	it	asserts	that	the	UK	will	leave	the	Customs	Union,	it	also	states	that	it	expects	that	the	UK	will
stay	in	the	Customs	Union	until	2021,	its	expected	date	for	a	trade	deal.	So	the	circle	is	still	not	squared	between
hard-line	Brexiteers	and	soft	Brexiteers,	and	it	is	unclear	when	exactly,	if	ever,	the	backstop	would	cease	to	apply.
So	far,	Brexiteer	responses	have	been	muted	and	DUP	responses	have	been	positive.	EU	and	Irish	government
responses	have	been	mixed.	Michel	Barnier,	the	EU’s	chief	negotiator,	said	that	extending	the	backstop	to	the	UK
was	not	an	option.
He	questioned	various	other	aspects,	such	as	the	omission	of	regulatory	alignment	as	part	of	the	backstop	in	the
UK’s	note,	contrary	to	the	backstop	protocol	of	8	December	2017.	Barnier	also	questioned	the	implication	that	the	UK
could	avoid	VAT	under	the	back-stop	arrangement.
The	Taoiseach,	Leo	Vardakar,	said	that	the	backstop	could	not	be	time-limited	and	emphasised	this	issue	as	the
central	concern,	not	mentioning	the	issue	of	extending	the	backstop	to	the	whole	of	the	UK.
There	are	signs	that	the	Irish	government,	contrary	to	some	UK	media	accounts	and	some	DUP	accounts,	is	not
unsympathetic	to	Theresa	May’s	own	constraints.	The	Irish	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs,	Simon	Coveney,	was
reported	as	saying	to	Theresa	May	that	he	would	help	give	her	bargaining	space	in	the	Brexit	negotiations	if	she
faced	down	the	Brexiteers.
The	Taoiseach	stated	on	June	9th	that	he	was	not	pessimistic	about	a	deal	being	reached	in	October	to	allow
progression	to	trade	talks.	Both	Varadkar	and	Michel	Barnier	have	played	down	the	significance	of	the	June	summit
altogether.
The	Irish	government	has	mentioned	over	the	past	three	months	that	it	is	open	to	possible	solutions.	For	example,	it
said	that	it	did	not	necessarily	rule	out	the	customs	partnership	idea.
Clearly,	the	Irish	government	and	the	EU	are	governed	by	two	main	priorities:
to	protect	the	rules	of	the	single	market,	including	regulatory	alignment;	and
to	protect	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	and	the	soft	border
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These	priorities	are	shared	by	both	the	EU	and	Ireland.	However,	Ireland’s	proximity	to	Northern	Ireland,	the	history
of	the	conflict	in	Northern	Ireland,	and	its	proximity	to	the	UK	mean	protecting	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	and	a	soft
border	are	core	priorities.
So	a	backstop	solution	that	applies	to	Northern	Ireland	and	the	UK	would	solve	many	problems	arising	from	the
border	and	the	DUP’s	opposition	to	‘special	status’.	However,	it	would	open	up	the	charge	of	‘cherry-picking’,	which
could	undermine	the	aim	of	maintaining	the	integrity	of	the	single	market.
Amendment	of	the	technical	note	so	that	some	‘cherry-picking’	implications	are	diluted	–	such	as	the	UK
government’s	stated	wish	to	avoid	VAT,	or	its	free	trade	agreement	aspirations	–	could	allow	for	EU	compromise	on
other	issues,	such	as	extending	the	backstop	to	all	of	the	UK.
Image	by	Keith
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The	Irish	government’s	task	in	the	months	ahead	is	to	stay	firmly	on	the	EU	team,	to	hold	firm	about	the	necessity	of
a	backstop,	but	to	create	space	for	the	UK	government	and	the	EU	to	compromise	on	other	elements	of		the
technical	note.
The	end	result	should	be	a	bespoke	arrangement	that	does	not	imply	‘cherry-picking’	and	that	avoids	a	land	and	a
sea	border	between	Ireland	and	the	UK.
Theresa	May’s	task	is	to	avoid	a	cliff-edge	Brexit,	while	preserving	her	leadership.	To	reach	a	deal	in	October,	she
needs	to	maintain	the	DUP’s	support	and	that	of	her	cabinet,	but	also	to	keep	the	Irish	government	and	the	EU	on
board.
It	is	noteworthy	that,	in	contrast	to	reports	that	David	Davis	got	his	way	in	ensuring	the	backstop	would	be	temporary,
there	were	other	reports	the	temporary	nature	was	aspirational,	and	dependent	on	another	solution.
On	this	interpretation,	in	small	steps	Theresa	May	was	moving	the	UK	towards	a	soft	Brexit.
Overall,	there	is	evidence	that	all	sides	perceive	a	common	interest	in	reaching	agreement	in	October.	It	has	not
always	been	clear	to	what	extent	Theresa	May	perceived	this	common	interest.	So	this	perception,	combined	with
the	existence	of	a	written	proposal	from	the	UK	government,	constitutes	progress.
Therefore,	the	strategy	in	the	next	three	months	will	be	to	identify	issues	in	the	technical	note	that	can	be	agreed	and
where	compromise	can	occur.	The	EU	and	the	Irish	government	are	frustrated	at	the	UK	government’s	slow
progress,	and	the	challenge	from	Brexiteers	is	a	constant	threat.
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However,	in	comparison	with	2017,	when	the	British-Irish	bargaining	relationship	was	increasingly	adversarial,	the
UK’s	technical	note	and	the	Irish	government’s	response	do	at	least	offer	hope	for	a	more	cooperative	and
substantive	bargaining	relationship	emerging.	Hopefully,	this	will	happen	in	time	for	the	crunch	October	summit.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	It	first	appeared	on	UK	in	the	Changning	Europe.
Etain	Tannam	is	Associate	Professor	in	International	Peace	Studies,	Trinity	College	Dublin.
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